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Abstract 
We take up the widely held view that the observed discrepancy between law on the books and law in action has 
prevented economic transition and investigate its role for the failure of the Bulgarian credit market. In doing so, we 
focus on the role of injunctive informal institutions which have become internalized in the course of social 
development. Based on cross-cultural psychology, we show that a particular bundle of fundamental social norms 
which constitute basic value orientations have both prevented the development of stabilizing regulations and an 
overall compliance with prevailing laws. 
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1. Introduction 
The break-up of communism and the decision of involved countries to establish market 
economies hit the world unexpectedly. By then economic scholars had not devoted many 
resources to problems of economic transition. Hence they borrowed concepts that the major 
Washington institutes1 had developed for emerging countries, in particular with the purpose to 
overcome the Latin American structural crisis (Kolodko, 2002). Following the original version of 
the Washington Consensus necessary as well as sufficient conditions for the successful 
implementation of functioning market economies are stabilization policies that impose hard 
budget constraints on all actors, free trade with goods and capital, privatization and deregulation. 
Countries like the Czech Republic that took much effort to follow the Washington Consensus 
experienced a harsh economic downturn and in this respect they did not differ significantly from 
countries which opted for other ways (McDermott, 2003). Increasingly it became evident that the 
most crucial hurdles on their ways to market economies were missing or false and ineffective 
enforcement mechanisms (Kolodko, 2002). The role of social norms and related to this of social 
capital became the topic of quite a few articles (Raiser, 1997; 1999). In this context it also 
became evident that law transplants may lead to situations where law is on the books only but not 
in action, and it is in this respect too, that social norms assume a crucial role (Gray, 1997; Pistor, 
1999). The relationship between legal and social norms can be complementary in the sense that 
social norms support the enforcement of the law or indicate the necessity of a new law. However, 
the relationship between legal and social norms can also be substitutive in the sense that social 
norms undermine the law thus leading to institutional inconsistency. It has been found that law 
transplants in particular bear the risk of institutional inconsistency thus imposing a major hurdle 
to successful transition. 
In the following paper we take up the idea that the interplay between legal and social norms 
affects economic transition and in doing so we focus on Bulgaria’s bank credit markets. In 
particular we are interested in the question to what extent institutional inconsistency might have 
contributed to the failure of the Bulgarian banking system in channelling households’ savings 
into profitable and growth enhancing investment projects. We focus on the bank credit market 
because bank loans provide the most important financial source to firms in transition countries, 
and this is in particular the case in Bulgaria. Our article differs from the numerous publications 
                                                 
1 John Williamson coined the term “Washington Consensus” and summarized the main proposals, cf Williamson 
(1990) 
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which focus on the Bulgarian banking system insofar as we analyse the interaction between legal 
and social norms as crucial determinants of the functioning of Bulgaria’s bank credit market. In 
taking up the idea of institutional inconsistency we borrow from those publications that have a 
focus on law transplants and economic transition. However, we go further by giving the 
institutional inconsistency hypothesis a theoretical underpinning. In this regard we resort to the 
law and economics literature as well as to research results on cultural value dimensions which 
have been achieved in cultural psychology.  
Our analysis will reveal that the causes for the Bulgarian banking crisis are deeply rooted in a 
value system that has produced social norms which countervail legal principles of sound banking. 
In this respect the absence of the rule of law in the business sector and civil society but also – and 
crucially so – among members of the government, members of the parliament as well as members 
of the judiciary is shown to have plaid a pivotal role. The absence of the rule of law also explains 
why at the end of the banking crisis Bulgaria opted for the introduction of a currency board which 
constitutes an external legal enforcement mechanism with respect to the banking sector. 
In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows: The next section provides some theory on 
the interaction between law and social norms. The merits and gaps of game-theoretic approaches 
will be clarified. These gaps are shown to be filled by the theory of value dimensions as proposed 
by cultural psychologists like Hofstede and Schwartz. We then proceed illuminating the role of 
banks and bank credit in the financial systems and make evident how their behaviour and in due 
consequence the soundness and efficiency of the banking system is affected by legal and social 
norms. In section 4 we turn to Bulgaria and the functioning of its bank credit market. In doing so 
we use the theory of value dimension which delivers an explanation for Bulgaria’s institutional 
legacy. We show how the ensued institutional inconsistency drove Bulgaria into a banking crisis 
and evaluate implications of the currency board for the soundness and efficiency of the bank 
credit market. 
2. Approaches to Explaining the Interaction of Law and Social Norms 
2.1 Definitions and Preliminary Remarks 
Following the New Institutional Economics we define institutions as rules plus their enforcement 
mechanisms. Formal institutions rely on legal enforcement, informal institutions on private 
enforcement. Norms in our definition constitute a subset of the set of institutions by having an 
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obligatory i.e. injunctive content, with legal norms constituting a subset of formal institutions and 
social norms being a subset of informal institutions. 
 
Compatible market economies based on democratic principles are norms promoting processes of 
social interaction in which individual and social preferences are reconciled thus enhancing 
aggregate welfare. Market economies allow for a high degree of individual freedom to choose 
actions that best serve individual ends. Since individuals are in need of others to reach their 
personal goals, social interaction is necessary but not sufficient in order achieve a Pareto-efficient 
situation. The reason is that some individuals might have the capacity and willingness to increase 
their personal welfare at the cost of others. In order to avoid these kinds of involuntary 
redistributions, cooperation is needed. Institutions assume a crucial role in setting individuals 
appropriate incentives.  
 
Law consists of rules which impose restrictions upon human behaviour in the sense that they 
constrain the set of feasible actions individuals may choose upon in order to achieve their goals. 
The extent to which these restrictions are binding, however, depends on the existence of effective 
enforcement or equivalently, sanctioning mechanisms. In western economies which are based on 
the factual independence of the courts, this effectiveness has usually been taken for granted. By 
consequence, legal norms typically are defined as rules which are effectively enforced by state 
coercion. 
Social norms, too, affect human behaviour. Like in the case of legal norms, this may happen by 
imposing restrictions. However, social norms may also be internalized thus shaping actors’ 
preferences. The effectiveness of social norms depends on private enforcement mechanisms. In 
terms of internalized social norms external sanctioning mechanisms are replaced by feeling of 
guilt or satisfaction. By contrast, social norms depending on external mechanisms rely on the loss 
of reputation, despise by others or on ostracism all of which give rise to costs implying disutility. 
Of particular interest for the topic of this paper are norms that involve a sense of obligation 
(Eisenberg, 1999). By this is meant that the violation of an obligational or synonymously – 
injunctive – norm leads to self-criticism or criticism by others.2 Social norms which improve the 
                                                 
2 Eisenberg draws a clear demarcation line between pure regularities and obligational norms. Some scholars denote 
these mere regularities as conventions. It can be doubted, however, whether such a clear-cut distinction actually 
exists, because even those norms that appear to be pure regularities at first sight often contain “ought” messages. 
Think of the convention not to work on Sundays. When this rule was disputed by politicians in Germany who 
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performance of liberal market economies are frequently called pro-social norms examples of this 
being truth-telling, meeting one’s commitments, solidarity, the a priori inclination to cooperate in 
Prisoner Dilemma’s situations. Norms like this allow trust to emerge which as soon as it extends 
the boundaries of small communities and characterizes social interaction in a society as such and 
in this way turns into (positive) social capital. 
 
(Injunctive) social norms and the law are not independent. First, the relationship between legal 
and social norms can be supportive. This is the case if social norms and the law complement each 
other. Then private enforcement mechanisms will reduce the importance of legal enforcement 
mechanisms or even replace them. In the law and economics literature we find the term 
“expressive law” to characterize such a situation. An example is given by Robert Cooter (1998) 
who refers to the introduction of a law in California that prescribed dog owners to remove dog 
mess in the streets (scooper-pooper law) which has been enforced effectively so far, but hardly 
ever by using the courts. Rather, people claimed from dog owners to remove the mess made by 
their dogs by stating that “it’s the law” which obviously was sufficient to induce dog owners to 
uphold this law. On the other hand, social norms and legal norms may compete with each other 
thus leading to institutional inconsistency. If this is the case, the relative strength of private 
enforcement mechanism as compared to legal enforcement mechanisms decides on which type of 
the norm will finally be complied with. Law then has to become imperative in the sense that legal 
enforcement mechanisms have to become sufficiently coercive. However, the situation is not that 
simple. The reason is that those who are responsible for law enforcement themselves might be 
guided by the same social norms that undermine the functioning of the law. Stated differently, 
law will neither be imperative nor expressive as long as the judiciary lacks factual independence. 
In contrast, societies which are marked by the factual independence of the judiciary, the 
expressive part of the law as compared to imperativeness, looms large. In these societies, law is 
not only on the books, but in action. To conclude, whenever the system of prevailing social 
norms does not support informal law enforcement, it can also not be expected that legal 
enforcement procedures will work effectively as long as the independence of the courts cannot be 
ensured. This makes evident that a factual independence of the court relies on the acceptance of 
the rule of law as a social norm, i.e. a binding rule which is privately enforced. 
                                                                                                                                                              
favoured open shops even on Sundays, a vivid debate started which turned around normative issues that even 
touched a moral content of the norm to rest on Sundays. 
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Basically the rule of law states that members of a society are allowed to exercise power, i.e. to 
have the capacity to exercise choice only if they are entitled to do so by the law. Thus 
understood, the rule of law implies that those with legitimate power are expected to use it, i.e. the 
courts are expected to enforce the law, and it also implies a general compliance with the law. In 
societies where this rule of law is missing, law enforcement has a high probability to be rather 
poor thus leading to the predomination of countervailing social norms in all areas of life. As a 
result the society may continue to live with a high gap between law on the books and law in 
action.3 Negative social effects have to be expected in particular if prevailing law is based on 
democratic principles, and if disobedience with the law undermines a democratic order. However, 
there are exceptions characterizing situations where the law is used to formalize power relations 
which entail terror and violence. Hence if we henceforth use the term “rule of law” Hence if we 
henceforth refer to the rule of law we tacitly assume that law is based on democratic principles. 
 
The posted relationship between legal and social norms raises several questions which all turn 
around the issue of causality: Do social norms decide on which laws are sustainable in a society? 
Are there ways how new laws themselves might affect social norms? Under which conditions 
will these social norms support law enforcement? In the following we will show how these issues 
are tackled by two approaches representing an external view on the one hand and internal view 
on the other. 
2.2 The External View 
For many years social norms were largely ignored both in the so-called mainstream economics as 
well as in the law literature of the Anglo-Saxon type. Increasingly, however, they are attracting 
the attention of in particular law and economics scholars.4 Economic scholars’ interest in social 
norms and their interaction with legal norms is related to empirical findings that social norms 
affect the efficiency of resource allocation as well as economic growth. In the literature the 
impact of social norms on the economy has predominantly been discussed under the heading 
“social capital”.5 By this is meant that the way how people interact with each other affects 
aggregate welfare, i.e. social interaction produces externalities. For example if cheating, lying, 
                                                 
3 Pistor (1999) found evidence for such a discrepancy in South East Asia. 
4 Prominent initiators have been Robert C. Ellickson and Richard A. Posner. Cf for example Ellickson (1998), 
(2001); Posner (1998).  
5 Cf Bourdieu (1983), Coleman (1988), Putnam (1995), Fukuyama (1999). 
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bribing and stealing are commonly accepted behaviours i.e. social norms, then the process of 
social interaction will be marked by negative externalities – negative social capital – which is 
welfare deteriorating at an aggregate level. By contrast, if the process of social interaction is 
marked by truth-telling, honouring commitments, reciprocity, solidarity and some apriori 
inclination to cooperate, i.e. to take mutual benefits into account, which all denote social norms, 
then general trust will follow exceeding the personal level thus rendering an externality.  
 
The external approach views social norms from a pure instrumentalist perspective. In this respect 
social norms – like the law – restrict the options among which individuals may choose in order to 
achieve their objectives. This external view uses evolutionary game-theory where the evolution 
of social rules traditionally has a tradition. Within this framework individuals copy behaviours 
that have proven successful to others. In this way these behaviours are diffused and hence 
replicated. Successful behaviours thus become privileged cultural models (Bowles et al., 1997). 
Against this background, pro-social norms like truth-telling, honouring one’s commitment 
reciprocity, and the a priori inclination to cooperate, develop if social interaction is marked by 
structural traits which characterize small communities: High exit and entry costs increase the 
frequency of interaction between the same members which in its turn lowers the cost of accessing 
information about other actors. This will increase members’ initiative to act in ways beneficial to 
others (e.g. telling the truth). A high frequency of interaction between the same people together 
with high exit and entry costs increases the probability of retaliation for uncooperative behaviour. 
Both, low cost of information and a high probability of retaliation imply that the immediate 
benefits of defecting are significantly outweighed by high future benefits of building up a 
reputation for cooperative behaviour. Given this, high exit and entry costs tend to reinforce the 
information and retaliation effect rendering truth-telling and an inclination to cooperate as social 
norms providing a set of stable and widely shared expectations about other actors’ willingness to 
well-behave.6 
 
Robert Cooter (2001) rightly criticizes that this widely used model may explain norms arising in 
small groups but not in a large society being marked by a high level of anonymity and low exit 
and entry costs. In larger communities access to information is costly and retaliation effects may 
be low. This implies in particular that the enforcement of cooperation which requires the 
                                                 
6 Cf Shapiro (1983); Axelrod (1984); Gintis (1989); Kreps (1990); Bowles et al. (1997). 
 8
punishment of defectors may turn into a costly undertaking. Cooter makes evident, that in models 
drawing on the external view, the cost of punishing defectors, i.e. the cost of enforcing 
cooperative behaviour cannot be assumed to be sufficiently small a priori if we leave the small 
group and turn to the large society, rather it may be positively correlated with the size of 
population and thus turn out to be too high to foster pro-social norms. In a small model he makes 
evident how in large societies the existence of a legal norm can give rise to complementary social 
norms which help to make the law expressive. The upshot is that the mere existence of a law 
reduces costs of private enforcement thus increasing the portion of those actors which are willing 
to sanction defectors. However, in deriving this result, he tacitly assumes effective legal 
enforcement which in the end is based on people’s belief in the metanorm that law has to be 
abided to, i.e., in the rule of law. It is indeed in this case that it is easier and more effective to say 
“it’s the law” than “tell the truth”. 
2.3 The Internal View 
Game-theoretic approaches fail with respect to two problems which characterize in particular 
transition countries. First social norms may arise or they exist which do not increase but decrease 
aggregate welfare. These are norms that render behaviours socially acceptable which lead to 
redistributions of aggregate wealth rather than increasing it. Second, legal enforcement may be 
poor which, too, may be an outcome of prevailing “bad” social norms. By drawing on underlying 
value dimensions, the so-called internal view offers explanations how all types of social norms 
those enhancing social welfare and those reducing it, may evolve and it appears better suited to 
explaining conflicts between the law and social norms (Licht, 2002; Licht et al., 2003). Contrary 
to external approaches the internal view states that individuals internalize social norms which 
then become part of their objectives. As a rule economists obviously have problems with this 
notion as becomes evident for example in Basu (1998) who denotes internalized social norms as 
“rationality-limiting”. Eisenberg (1999) criticizes this view by emphasizing that individual 
preferences do not necessarily relate exclusively to material goods and wealth. Rather he 
considers it “… perfectly rational to forgo an increase in wealth by adhering to an internalized 
social norm or, for that matter, by engaging in conduct that is intellectually, creatively, or socially 
gratifying” (Eisenberg, 1999:9). He then quotes Cass Sunstein who even considers individual 
rationality as a function of social norms (Sunstein, 1996). Internalized social norms imply that an 
agent “… may maximize his utility by keeping his promises or telling the truth, even in cases 
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where breaking a promise or lying would maximize the actor’ wealth” (Eisenberg 1999:9, 10). 
Eisenberg also emphasizes that a cost-benefit perspective, even if it includes psychological cost 
like the feeling of guilt or psychological benefits like the feeling of satisfaction might not suffice 
to explain the role of internalized norms. Rather, sympathy and commitment would have to be 
recognized as independent motivations. They form an actor’s moral or social character and offer 
an explanation for situations in which people abide by norms for the sake of the norms. 
  
The internal view draws heavily on findings achieved by cross-cultural psychology on the 
relation between individual and social preferences. Following this approach, social preferences 
are given content and structure by using the concept of value dimensions. Values denote trans-
situational criteria and as such constitute internalized guiding principles of life. Upholding values 
conveys the feeling of pleasure or satisfaction, whereas violating values conveys feelings of guilt. 
Every social order is based on commonly accepted values which express socially approved 
objectives (Licht, 2002; Licht et al., 2003; Kaplow, Shavell, 2001). In this way shared values are 
the essence of culture and convey members a notion of what is to be viewed as good and 
desirable in the society. Schwartz et al. (1995) have found that every society recognizes a set of 
values which is basically the same. However, different cultures can be made out depending on the 
weights they attach to each value. In this respect unique cultural profiles can be achieved, that 
may be distinguished by their value dimensions and the system of social norms that follow from 
these values. (Licht, 2002:16)  
 
Theories of values with respect to their relationship to social norms have been developed by 
Geert Hofstede (1980; 1991; 2001) and Shalom Schwartz (1992). As a point of departure 
Hofstede and Schwartz consider basic issues that confront every society. A first issue concerns 
the relationship between individuals and social groups or the society. Individualism in the 
terminology of Hofstede and autonomy in the terminology of Schwartz denote a cultural value 
that attaches to individuals a high degree of personal autonomy. Individuals should be given all 
opportunities to develop their own identities with tight social links being restricted to the 
immediate and nuclear family consisting of brothers, sisters and parents only. Individualism 
(autonomy) also attaches much value to self-responsibility. In contrast, collectivism or 
embeddedness in the terminology of Schwartz denotes a cultural value according to which 
individuals (ought to) be embedded into social groups implying that they identify themselves by 
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the social network they belong to. This social network goes beyond the realms of the nuclear 
family or kinship. Group solidarity and unquestioning group loyalty are important. A second 
issue concerns the question how responsible behaviour which preserves the social fabric 
(Schwartz et al., 1995) can be guaranteed. In this respect the wielding of power gains importance. 
Following Hofstede, high power distance denotes a cultural trait that attaches high value to 
unequal distributions of power, whereas low power distance attaches high value to treating 
people as equals. Schwartz distinguishes between egalitarianism and hierarchy in this respect. If 
power distance is high then steep hierarchies denote a highly appreciated relationship between 
higher-ups and lower-downs. If power distance is low, however, hierarchies will be accepted only 
for the sake of convenience. A third issue concerns the relation of humankind to the natural and 
social world. In this regard Schwartz distinguishes between mastery and harmony with mastery 
placing emphasis on getting ahead through mastering the natural and social environment in order 
to further individual or group interest, and harmony denoting the acceptance of a given 
environment. Hofstede considers the role of women compared to men in a society as well as the 
role of uncertainty avoidance. Following Hofstede the first aspect is in particular important 
because the relative dominance of either sex decides on the prevalence of specific values like 
solidarity, sympathy for the weak, harmony, preservation of nature and traditions which are 
ascribed to feminine societies as opposed to material success and progress, exploitation of any 
available opportunity, sympathy for the strong which characterize masculine societies. Finally, 
depending on whether cultures value uncertainty as something threatening or fascinating, 
Hofstede distinguishes between high or low uncertainty avoidance. 
 
These basic value dimensions prevail in every society, however, the weight which is attached to 
each may differ substantially moulding specific cultures. For example Schwartz et al. (1995) 
found that Western Europe as well as in the USA values like autonomy and egalitarianism play a 
more important role than in anywhere else in the world. However, he also found that Western 
Europe is not as homogeneous in this regard. In particular he found that in the US hierarchy and 
mastery are considered as more important than in (continental) Western Europe where 
egalitarianism and harmony are valued higher. 
 
Values become internalized through socialization and in this way they mould individual 
preferences, and in this way societal members replicate what previous generations have done thus 
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contributing to the permanence of a particular culture (Licht, 2002). The thus achieved cultural 
profile allows individuals to calculate how their actions will be assessed by others, i.e. whether 
they will be considered as good or bad, right or wrong. It is in this way that cultural values shape 
more concrete social norms, i.e. regularities that are embraced by a critical mass of societal 
members thus giving rise to a pyramid of social norms with cultural values for example 
autonomy (individualism) over embeddedness (collectivism) as its basis (Licht, 2002). These 
fundamental norms set the stage for more concrete norms on higher strata. For example 
embeddedness (collectivism) together with high power distance promote the evolution of the 
social norm that people may accept bribery and corruption as something benevolent.7 In contrast, 
autonomy (individualism) together with egalitarianism (low power distance) might foster social 
norms that prescribe fairness in the process of voluntary exchange of goods, factors of production 
and ideas between equals.  
 
What role do legal norms play in this context? First, the “density” of legislation embraced by a 
society may depend on its cultural profile. For example uncertainty avoiding countries will have a 
greater desire for a dense network of (written) laws than less uncertainty-avoiding countries with 
Germany being a prominent example for the first group. Of particular interest for the topic of this 
paper is the relationship between the rule-of-law-norm and the value dimensions. In societies that 
subscribe to this norm, law on the books and law in action are basically the same. Following 
Licht et al. (2003), a widespread acceptance of the rule of law will be more likely in societies 
marked by autonomy and egalitarianism. Legal norms that are upheld offer a fair chance to each 
individual to follow his or her individual goals. In collectivist societies by contrast the taking care 
of individuals is assumed by the group. This may lead to a low compliance with the law because 
group norms may be valued higher. The rule of law, too, expresses that individuals respect others 
as equals which promotes their willingness to comply with constraints on personal freedoms 
favouring others. However, the rule of law will be rather incompatible with hierarchy (high 
power distance). The reason is that with high power distance people feel entitled to of take 
advantage of subordinated people, and this irrespective of what the law prescribes whereas lower-
downs accept this as a fact of life (Licht, 2002). 
                                                 
7 This view is also held in the Human Development Report on Bulgaria, 1998. 
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3. Legal and Social Norms in the Bank Credit Market 
3.1 Legal and Social Norms and the Role of Banks 
Banks are an element of the financial system which serves primarily two functions, namely to 
provide the economy with money and to facilitate the intertemporal exchange of purchasing 
power. Intertemporal exchange implies that savers (so-called surplus units) provide financial 
funds in the present whereas investors (so-called deficit units) promise to repay in a yet unknown 
future gives rise to conflicting interests which the parties seek to solve in a financial contract. 
Temporal divergence requires the solution of problems the scope of which extends the situation 
to be usually encountered in commodity markets. Of particular importance in this respect are 
information deficiencies regarding the willingness of the deficit unit to honour his or her 
promises (information asymmetry) and his ability to do so which is closely related of yet 
unknown future contingencies. Information deficiencies give rise to special coordination 
problems which require special solutions. These special solutions are characterized by a great 
variety of contractual alternatives thus taking into account that risks may be different and that the 
actors’ behaviours towards risk may be different, too.  
 
The financial economics literature shows that debt results as an optimal financial contract if the 
saver is unable to verify the investor’s true profit or wealth situation at the repayment date 
(Townsend 1979) or, alternatively, if the saver is risk-averse in the sense that he dislikes 
fluctuations of income.8 Equity then is optimal if for example both parties are risk-averse and 
thus want to share the risk of fluctuating revenues.  
 
Financial contracts also differ with respect to their material duration. As McNeil (1974) has 
shown, short or long durations provide different reactions of the trading parties to uncertainty 
with respect to future developments. A short duration implies that the parties do not want to cope 
with unforeseen contingencies and thus restrict their relation to a foreseeable future, i.e. exit is 
used to minimize risk (transactional contracts). Alternatively, a long duration implies that the 
parties are ready to deal with unforeseen contingencies by resorting to renegotiation when the 
true state of the world materializes, i.e. voice is used (relational contracts). One explanation for a 
long contractual duration has been offered by New Institutionalists who point to contract-specific 
                                                 
8 This is a major result of principal agency theory. 
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investments (Williamson, 1975). By this is meant that potential contract parties may have to 
invest into the creation and sustenance of a contractual relationship, and the fruits of these 
investments can only be harvested within the ongoing relationship. 
 
Typically in a market economy demand and supply of commodities are coordinated in markets as 
the predominating coordination organization. This, however, is not the case with respect to 
financial funds. Here the variety of contracts has given rise to a variety of coordination 
organizations. The market solution has proven successful in the case of highly standardized debt 
and equity contracts which allow to exit at factually any time are traded in organized financial 
markets, where the term “organized” indicates that the functioning of these markets rely crucially 
on formal rules that all intend to insure high quality on the part of the users of financial funds. 
These formal rules which are largely backed by the law impose barriers to access by requiring 
minimum quality standards and aim at market transparency through the imposition of disclosure 
obligations. In this way organized financial markets rest crucially on public access to relevant 
information about the quality of investors. 
 
Banks in contrast step between saving units and investors by offering them separate contracts. 
The first theoretical approaches to explaining the rise of banks argued in an institutional vacuum.9 
Savers are provided with a deposit contract that provides them with liquidity insurance. Investors 
are offered debt contracts which regularly have a longer maturity than deposits. As Diamond 
(1984) has shown, the safety of deposits crucially depends on the validity of the law of great 
numbers with respect to borrowers. By this is meant that banks attract a sufficiently large number 
of borrowers whose risks are identically and independently distributed. In this case the repayment 
of loans to be expected as an average over many borrowers equals the size of factual repayments 
to be distributed to depositors. Another advantage of intermediated lending as opposed to direct 
lending concerns control costs which are significantly lower in the first case. Finally, due to 
repeated lending it pays for banks to undertake and develop more sophisticated and efficient 
screening and monitoring technologies. Lower control costs and incentives to undertake efficient 
screening and monitoring devices avoid a free-rider problem that exists with respect to 
controlling in financial markets where the supply side of financial funds is marked by a multitude 
of small savers relying on others to do the job.  
                                                 
9 Diamond et al. (1983); Diamond (1984); Williamson (1987). 
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A current generation of models explaining the rise of banks acknowledges the role of the legal 
environment and social norms. In doing so, Diamond and Rajan (1999) and Rajan (1998) put 
contractual incompleteness into the centre of their arguments. If contracts are incomplete, then 
they suffer in particular from the risk that they cannot be enforced. Legal enforcement may be 
impossible if judicial authorities are corruptible or a transparent bankruptcy procedure is missing. 
Legal enforcement might also be impossible, if the contract contains gaps and ambiguities due to 
the parties’ inability to foresee all future contingencies that affect the creditworthiness of the 
borrower. If the legal enforcement of a contract is not possible, effective private enforcement 
mechanism might still be available. It is in this respect that banks might do a better job than 
markets. Following Diamond, Rajan (1999) the reason concerns the details of the relationships 
between a bank, its borrowers and depositors as well. These details are marked by noncontractual 
mechanisms like a bank’s investment into reputation (Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1993), or 
its investment in relationships with clients (Diamond and Rajan, 1999). Furthermore, borrowers, 
too, might have an incentive to building a reputation for honouring their obligations. What the 
authors refer to is that mutual trust my act as a powerful private enforcement mechanism. As we 
have seen in section 2, a trusting atmosphere may in particular emerge if a borrower or lender, 
respectively, expects to interact with the same party repeatedly and when exit and entry costs are 
high. Private enforcement of loans is then promoted by enduring relationships between banks and 
their borrowers marked by mutual endeavours to keep their reputation and hence a system of pro-
social norms.  
 
Following Rajan (1998), banks play a crucial role in underdeveloped countries where the missing 
rule of law together with the absence of widely available information technologies and widely 
used sophisticated accounting principles make debt contracts highly incomplete. Banks also play 
a role in mature economies marked by effective legal enforcement mechanisms. Their role in 
these countries is closely associated with intrinsic and deliberate contractual incompleteness. For 
quite a time we could also observe differences between mature economies with respect to the role 
banks actually played leading to a distinction between bank-based and market-based financial 
systems. In bank-based financial systems not only do bank loans play a prominent role for the 
financing of corporate investment. Furthermore the bank-borrower relationship is marked by an 
enduring relationship constituting relationship banking. In marked-based financial systems by 
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contrast banks offer rather short-run debt contracts thus mimicking financial markets (arm’s chair 
banking).  
3.2 The Role of Legal and Social Norms for the Functioning of the Bank Credit 
Market 10 
By providing the economy with money and “managing” the intertemporal exchange of 
purchasing power, a financial system contributes significantly to real development and the degree 
of price stability (Levine, 1997). Banks play a special role in this regard since their decisions on 
lending affect directly the supply of money and hence a major determinant of inflation (La Porta 
et al., 1998; Garretsen et al., 2003; Carlin et al., 1999). Moreover by selecting their borrowers 
they affect the choice of investment projects which in its turn has an impact on economic growth. 
 
The performance of the bank credit market measured by its contribution to economic growth and 
stability, is highly dependent on how banks and their clients handle information problems which 
both relate to information asymmetry as well as to uncertainty with respect to future 
developments of the economic and political environment. Arm chair’s lending provides some 
protection against external unforeseen contingencies but it does not protect a bank from 
borrowers’ attempts to exploit informational advantages about their own qualities. Relationship 
banking by contrast allows banks to mitigate the information asymmetry problem but leaves them 
with considerable risk following unforeseen contingencies. Relationship banking mirrors a high 
degree of cooperation between the borrower and the lender the mutual advantage of which rests 
on the degree of mutual trust which in its turn is highly correlated with pro-social norms like 
reciprocity, telling the truth and fulfilling one’s commitments. As game-theoretic approaches 
have revealed, these pro-social norms are likely to develop in small communities marked by high 
exit and entry costs and a high frequency to interact with one and the same party. In Japan the 
evolution of these communities was promoted by the “artificial” creation of Keiretsus, i.e. 
networks of firms and banks that were supposed to provide the firms with credit. In Germany 
these communities were promoted by extensive networks of bank branches together with regional 
constraints encountered by public savings banks but also by cooperative banks. Personal 
acquaintance between bank managers and firm owners of managers, banks’ interest in the well-
being of “their region” increased the attractiveness of these banking institutions in the eyes of 
                                                 
10 Cf La Porta et al. (1998), Garretsen et al. (2003). 
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local inhabitants. Exit and entry costs may in such an environment increase even further as the 
relationship develops and the parties undertake increasingly contract-specific relationships.  
 
However, it is also true that the German housebank system has outperformed the Japanese 
mainbank system. For both countries harmony was found as a cultural value (Schwartz et al. 
1995) which promotes solidarity rendering the sustainability of a relation more valuable than exit 
thus avoiding holdup in cases requiring renegotiation, In Germany a high emphasis on both 
autonomy (individualism) and egalitarianism might explain the existence of an appropriate 
balance between strong and weak ties in the sense of Granovetter (1985) which helps to avoid 
that exit is rejected as a possible sanctioning mechanism independent on its economic 
consequences. By contrast, the “mixture” of embeddedness, hierarchy and harmony might 
promote a corporatism leading to the accumulation of bad debts.  
 
So far we have largely ignored the role of law to which we turn now. Indeed the law has always 
played an important role in the banking sectors of market economies. Legal norms regulate the 
rights of creditors and lenders, respectively and above all are directed to ensuring the stability of 
the banking sector thus preventing banking crises. It is with respect to this last mentioned purpose 
that we talk about (state) regulation. Indeed, empirical evidence has shown that banking crises 
have been a widespread phenomenon not only in developing, emerging or transition countries 
(Basel Committee, 2004). There is now a vast literature dealing with the major reasons for 
banking crises.11 This literature puts the interaction between poor governance practices in 
banking institutions and non-financial firms on the one hand and adverse macroeconomic 
conditions on the other into the centre. It is emphasized that even if poor governance concerning 
credit, market or interest rate risk hits one or just a few banks, contagion effects due to 
depositors’ inability to distinguish between good and bad banks as well as a high degree of 
concentration leading to pronounced inter-bank relationships may foster a global banking crises.  
 
The history of regulation in the banking sector began in the 1930s when a severe panic threw the 
industrial world into a deep depression and left millions of household highly impoverished due to 
the loss of their deposits. The network of regulations intensified in the course of time. A major 
reason for this development is to be found in the various loopholes which the law provided for 
                                                 
11 A survey is presented by Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2000) and the Basel Committee (2004). 
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bank mangers and which regularly resulted in even higher risks. A prominent example of this is 
posed by the deposit insurance system which has become a core of regulation to protect in 
particular small savers’ wealth. If deposits are insured by some external mechanism, this may set 
bank managers incentives to engage in excessive risk taking, i.e., deposit insurance may lead to 
moral hazard. Also capital requirement schemes which were proposed by the Basle Committee in 
the 1980s and were translated into national laws by OECD have frequently not fulfilled 
expectations setting banks incentives to take even higher risks (Chami et al., 2003). Basel II 
contains a novel conception of regulation insofar as banks take a more active rule in 
accomplishing the goals of regulation. This is achieved firstly by their obligation to make their 
risk measures transparent, either by following external ratings or by developing their own models 
which of course have to find regulators’ approval. Of equal importance is their role in the process 
of supervision which rests on a communication process between banks and regulators.  
 
Basel II reveals that regulators and supervisors having experienced their limits as regards the 
effectiveness of prudential regulation and its enforcement, now increasingly view the objective of 
sound banking systems to be a problem of overall governance instead of top-down state 
regulations (Borio, 1993; Das et al., 2004). Overall governance is meant to describe practices that 
are performed by all participants of the banking systems, i.e., regulators as well as banking 
institutions but also firms and beyond that the broader public sector. Das et al. (2004) use the 
term “government nexus” in this respect to describe the impact of government practices at each 
layer – government, supervisors, banking institutions and the corporate sector. In this respect the 
regulators and supervisors take into account that law is not enough. The emphasis on practices of 
good governance acknowledges the support by pro-social norms that broaden the minds of the 
participants of financial systems to take mutual advantage into account.  
 
Broadly speaking, problems of governance typically encountered in financial systems relate to 
situations where two parties are supposed to cooperate but one party – the agent – has superior 
information or cannot be monitored perfectly by the other party – the principal – thus that 
problems of moral hazard arise. This indeed does not only characterize the relationship between 
banks and clients but also the relationship between banks and regulators with regulators being 
principals and banks being agents. Regulators or supervisors on the other hand are not only 
principals, however. Rather, they are part of a broader political system and thus depend on 
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politicians as their principals who by themselves might depend on the interests of a mighty 
banking industry. This might lead to forbearance in the sense that regulators who are concerned 
about their personal career and maybe future job prospects in the private sector impede effective 
enforcement of regulations or even postpone necessary legal norms. “Regulators may be 
“captured” by the industry they are supposed to oversee.” (Chami et al., 2003:15; Kane, 1989, 
1990).  
 
Traditionally, governance problems have been debated in the context with the relationship 
between stakeholders and managers in large corporations leading to the development of 
principles of practices of good governance like those recommended by the OECD or at national 
levels. The basic ideas are now increasingly recommended for the participants of the banking 
system in general and the bank credit market in particular. For example Das and Quintyn (2002) 
identified independence, accountability, transparency and integrity as important components of 
governance principles of the regulating and supervising sector. According to the principle of 
independence, the regulatory and supervisory agency should be “…insulated from improper 
influence from the political sphere and from the supervised entities.” (Das et al., 2004:15). 
Regulators and supervisors – given their independence – should be accountable to the legislature 
and to the public at large. Transparency relates to regulators’ objectives, procedures and 
decisions. It serves to reveal poor enforcement practices and to make regulation understandable 
to the public. Integrity requires from regulators to follow the “public” objective to ensure sound 
banking systems instead of their narrow self-interest.  
 
Licht et al. (2003) establish relationships between principles of good governance and cultural 
value dimensions. In particular, they have found that the rule of law as an overarching norm is 
endorsed by societal emphases on autonomy (individualism) and egalitarianism (low power 
distance). In contrast the rule of law is less likely to be found in countries whose culture 
emphasizes embeddedness and hierarchy. Relationships with more concrete social norms are 
easily detected. As soon as the rule of law is widely accepted in the society, independence of 
regulators and supervisors will mirror independence of the legal sector as such. Independence – if 
it does not stand on the books only – requires a high level of integrity on the part of regulators 
and supervisors, which, too is associated with the rule of law. However, as has been observed 
above, the rule of law can still be compatible with behaviours that do not violate a legal norm 
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which may be rather general but use the scope offered by the law in a socially harmful manner. 
Beyond that regulators ought to have a primary interest in a priori cooperation that takes the 
mutual advantage of all stakeholders’ interests into account. This is what integrity seeks to 
achieve. 
4. Implications for the Bulgarian Transition Process in General and 
the Bank Credit Market in Particular 
4.1 Some General Remarks on Economic Transition and the Conflict between 
Legal and Social Norms 
Socialist economic systems were characterized by highly centralized solutions to economic 
problems which, broadly speaking turn around the productive use of scarce resources and their 
distribution among the members of a society. By implication these systems rested on institutions 
constituting a top-down hierarchical societal order. Since obviously socialist countries have failed 
in covering the manifold needs of their populations, a system of rather informal institutions in 
these countries developed which was directed at attenuating the scarcity of goods. Depending on 
the severity with which socialist principles were introduced, these institutions ranged from 
private firms which allowed to increasing overall production to those that merely redistributed 
produced goods. To these institutions belonged rules governing voluntary exchange in 
underground markets as well as corruption and bribery which at the time characterized widely 
accepted behaviours even from a moral point of view, i.e. they posed social norms. The 
acceptance of bribery, corruption and other fraudulent behaviours as social norms is closely 
related to the finding that in Communist countries the rule of law apparently was lacking 
widespread acceptance. Following Tanchev (1998) the major reasons for a missing rule of law 
which she denotes as “legal nihilism” are to be found in the fact that communist constitutions 
never served to divide and thus limit power: “They were never intended to define the regime’s 
authority, for in reality the regime defined everything, including the constitution.” (Tanchev, 
1998). The endeavours of the regime which was completely represented by the communist party, 
were directed to sustaining its power and an important tool in this respect was to decide legal 
questions politically. It is in this way that the legal order was subordinated to “…the whims of a 
tyrant or a despotic majority.” (Tanchev, 1998:68).  
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In market economies by contrast the issue how to use scarce resources is shifted to individuals 
who seek to solve the problem in a utility maximizing manner. Market economies hence 
constitute bottom-up societies where individuals decide on the size of their income, on the ways 
how they earn it and on how they spend it. In this process individuals are dependent on each 
other, i.e. they have to interact and the basic idea is that this process of social interaction ought to 
be governed by a voluntary exchange of resources and goods the sustainability of which depends 
crucially on the existence of rules that guarantee fairness and mutual respect, i.e. norms like 
reciprocity, truth-telling, honouring one’s commitment etc play a crucial role. Law and social 
norms have to complement each other in this respect with the rule of law norm playing a crucial 
role. This is a main reason for the finding that market economies and democratic structures are 
coupled. The constitution of market economies ensures that powers are divided and limited and 
hence that the judiciary receives formal and material independence. 
 
Obviously, the communist legal order and the system of social norms whose development was 
promoted by communist law, stand in sharp contrast to the requirement of successful market 
economies. To the extent that the “typical” communist social order is rooted in internalized social 
norms which in the end rest on a cultural profile being marked by a combination of collectivism 
(embeddedness) and great power distance (hierarchy), ingrained cultural values strongly affect 
political decisions on the introduction of pro-market legal norms as well as the enforcement of 
newly established norms leading to institutional consistency in the sense that transplanted law is 
undermined by still prevailing social norms. Pistor (1999) shows that the pre-existence of 
countervailing social norms makes an immediate implementation of transplanted law ineffective 
and recommends a gradualist approach. 
4.2 Bulgaria’s Cultural Profile and Major Characteristics of the First Seven Years 
of Transition 
As John Bell remarks in his introductory article to “Bulgaria in Transition”, Bulgaria shares with 
other Balkan states many commonalities which have posed severe barriers to political and 
economic success in the course of transition. However, referring to the first seven years after the 
demise of communism, he adds that “…the Bulgarian model” has found its own path to 
unhappiness” (Bell, 1998:1). The roots for these peculiarities are connected to Bulgaria’s history 
which provides a rather unfavourable environment for the development of a democratic society. 
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During five centuries, Bulgaria was under Turkish rule, and Orthodox Bulgarians saw no reason 
to comply with Islamic law (Tanchev, 1998:68). Rather, disobedience to the law encompassing 
not only the civic society but also members of state and political institutions was considered as a 
national virtue. With Russian help the Ottoman era found an end by 1879 when a new 
constitution was put in place which by the standards of the time was characterized by a highly 
liberal orientation. Obviously, however, the liberal spirit of the constitution has never governed 
policymaking. Rather, as Tanchev (1998:67) puts it “…actual power steadily gravitated to the 
royal head-of-state.” Mitev (1998:39) characterizes the era until the rise of communism by three 
attitudes toward politics: “One looks on politics as a means of personal advancement and 
enrichment. The second takes the form of an aloof, sceptical, alienated attitude toward politics.” 
A third attitude finally characterizes a paternalistic tradition which led to the idealization of 
rescuers from all kinds of evils and leading to a cult of personality (Mitev, 1998:40). 
 
The communist era which started in 1944 led to a totalitarian regime with an undisputed role of 
the Communist Party (BCP) that used the judiciary for the strengthening and sustenance of its 
political power. Civil resistance upon its introduction was largely missing (Mitev, 1998).  
“The tradition of paternalism was revived in a communist form. The General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party (BCP) was nicknamed “Daddy.” … power in Bulgaria assumed a familial character and was becoming 
hereditary.” The best life insurance proved to be loyalty to the regime which guaranteed a job “… and with it the 
possibility, unknown in the West, of turning the workplace into a refuge from work” (Mitev, 1998:40).  
 
What kind of cultural profile is compatible with these behaviours? Quite a few empirical studies 
have been carried out throughout the 1990s to explore this issue (Davidkov, 2004). It is 
interesting to note that the latest sociological survey which was carried through between 2000 
and 2002 largely confirms the existence of engrained cultural values. The survey entitled 
“Organizational Culture in Bulgaria – 2000-2002”, followed the methodology of Geert Hofstede 
with the aim to calculate indices of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism – 
collectivism and masculinity – feminity (Davidkov, 2004). The study finds that still in 2002 
Bulgaria falls among countries with strong power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance. But 
whereas in other countries strong uncertainty avoidance leads to high respect of the law, this is 
not the case in Bulgaria which reveals that values do not appear in isolation. A low or missing 
respect of the law might be connected to high power distance coupled with collectiveness. 
Indeed, the study confirms that Bulgaria is better described by a low level of individualism and 
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correspondingly high level of collectivism implying that typically Bulgarians define their identity 
by the social network to which they belong and that trespassing this network leads to shame and 
loss. In accordance with this it was found that in most of the cases investigated personal opinion 
is not encouraged. “In most of the organizations the best employees have to “dissolve” into the 
great mass of people”. (Davidkov, 2004:22) Finally the study finds Bulgaria to value traits high 
that correspond to feminine values in the terminology of Hofstede. For example, in general both 
men and women are expected to be timid and not assertive. The prevailing norm for schools has 
been found to be the average student. Managers are more often concerned with solidarity among 
workers and not with competition between them. However, the study also makes evident that 
these values are more pronounced among the elderly, among less educated groups and among 
inhabitants of smaller towns and villages (Davidkov, 2004:28).  
 
A cultural portrait marked by collectivism (embeddedness), high power distance (hierarchy), high 
uncertainty aversion and aversion against competition and maximizing behaviour has indeed 
marked the process of political and economic transition to be observed in Bulgaria in general and 
the development of the banking sector in particular (National Human Development Report, 
1998). Successful economic transition is promoted by the interplay of the rule of law as a guiding 
principle both in the public as well as private sector with a civil society that actively controls the 
prevailing political institutions thus materializing the formally guaranteed democratic 
fundamentals, and individual actors who are willing to assume responsibilities for their personal 
welfare and accept principles of fairness in the process of social interaction. During the first 
seven years of transition in Bulgaria, neither condition was met. A fatal interaction between civil 
indifference towards ongoing political changes and the attempt of the former political elites to 
preserve their powers and privileges proved crucial in this respect. Indeed the demise of 
communism in Bulgaria was the result of activities by then ruling communist ministers who 
removed Todor Zhivkov from power thus retaining as much power as possible (Daskalov, 1998). 
It is true that Bulgaria had a new democratic constitution earlier than other transition countries. 
However, again, its ideas did not launch the necessary process of reforms. One major reason for 
this failure was the emergence of cooperative patterns between opposing parties in the Parliament 
which was fostered by a keen interest of its members in salaries, perquisites and work as 
lobbyists for shadowy economic groups (Daskalov, 1998). Hence structural reforms were 
considered by the parties in power as important only if they served the interests of their 
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supporters. This is in particular valid for the BSP – the former Communist party who came into 
power in 1994 but also for the short-lived government of the largest democratic party UDF in 
1991 which primarily focused on land restitution and in doing so met the interests of their most 
ardent supporters. By contrast, privatization of industrial plants was largely ignored (Daskalov, 
1998). 
In particular the rule of law never functioned properly. “Despite their formal independence from 
the government and the incumbent party, the judiciary and the police have been largely 
ineffective throughout the transition process” (Daskalov, 1998:25). Partly this can be explained 
by the still ruling tradition that politics rules the law and not the other way round. Of major 
importance, however, is corruption. Following the Human Development Report 1998, in 
Bulgaria corruption is still widely accepted as a social norm. It continued to flourish after the 
demise of communism due to the fact that political leaders did not take a moral leadership and in 
fact became part of corruptive and fraudulent practices. This led to a delay in privatization with 
continuing ambiguous property rights which reinforced corruption even more. Economic elites 
with close connections to the BSP guided the economic fate during the first seven years of 
transition, as Daskalov (1998) puts it: 
“It was from the BSP that most of them received the money and the official permission to start banks and other 
“businesses” … Once rich, they were able to gain their way in political administrative matters: refinancing unsound 
banks, appointing their protégés to key economic positions, dealing with disobedient politicians through threats or 
violence” (Daskalov, 1998:27). 
4.3 Implications for the Bank Credit Market during the First Seven Years of 
Transition 
Given the gigantic economic restructurings which are necessary in order to successfully turn a 
socialist country into a competitive market economy and given the low availability of internal 
financial funds during this process, it is without doubt true that the financial system plays an 
important role in channelling savings to promising investments without giving rise to rationing 
phenomena or conversely the accumulation of excessive risks thus plunging the economy into a 
financial crisis and hyperinflation. However, the same economic restructurings that are needed in 
favour of economic development pose tremendous challenges to providers and users of financial 
funds. Comparable historical examples had been missing, and hence providers of funds were 
exposed to radical uncertainty both with respect to the development of macroeconomic variables 
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and markets as well as with respect to the capability and willingness of the users of funds to 
honour their contractual obligations. Of course financial markets like the stock exchange or a 
market for corporate bonds will hardly develop in an environment lacking reliable accountancy 
principles, transparency and a kind of uncertainty that can be calculated in one way or another. 
However, this is not to say that banks are in a situation to handle the manifold information 
problems in the desired manner. Banks take deposits and originate loans, and in doing so they 
offer depositors liquidity insurance which in turn requires that banks handle risks appropriately. 
At the time when socialist countries opted for market economies no blueprint for a banking 
system was available that could be considered as sufficiently appropriate to handle the challenges 
of transition thus avoiding excessive risk-taking without resorting to massive credit rationing.  
 
Bulgaria started its transition process with three major drawbacks: On the one hand there existed 
a huge volume of external debt. On the other hand, Bulgaria had developed a considerable 
dependence on markets in USSR. Following Dobrinsky et al. (2000), in the late 1980s, Bulgarian 
trade with USSR represented 50 percent of all its trade flows. Moreover, the government 
interfered into all spheres of the Bulgarian economy, where any private initiative was largely 
missing (Berlemann et al., 2002:18). Hence from the very beginning the transition process 
promised to become harder for Bulgaria than for the rest of former socialist countries. On the 
other hand as Mihov (1999:4) puts it “…the disenchantment with the communist regime in 
Bulgaria had not reached its peak.” This might offer a plausible explanation for the fact that 
economic reforms during the whole period until 1997 had been taken rather half-heartedly and 
that reforms once implemented, used to be undermined. 
 
Between 1987 and 1990 the socialist banking system which was made up of three banks: the 
Bank of Foreign Trade, the State Savings Bank, in charge of household deposit mobilization and 
housing loans, and the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) in charge of currency issuance and 
lending to the corporate sector, was transferred into a two-tier system with the BNB as the central 
bank (Enoch, 2002). The bank branches of the BNB were converted into 59 new commercial 
banks. After in 1990 three more commercial banks had been licensed, the banking sector 
consisted of 71 relatively small banks. In response to this rather fragmented banking system, the 
Bulgarian government set up a Bank Consolidation Company (BCC) in 1992 with the purpose to 
serve as a temporary holding company for the shares of state-owned banks. It had furthermore a 
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mandate to merge existing banks and to strengthen them for privatization (Enoch et al., 2002). 
The first private banks were licensed in 1991 and grew heavily in numbers during the following 
years. With the exception of the First Private Banks they all remained small. 
 
In 1991 the Law on the BNB was adopted which formally granted the BNB independence from 
the government. The Law furthermore formulated objectives and tools that bore great 
resemblance to those of Western central banks (Berlemann et al., 2002). In 1992 the Law on 
Banks and Credit Activity was adopted which established the regulatory framework for the 
activities of bank institutions. It regulated licensing and enacted a minimum capital requirement 
of 4%. Furthermore banks were required to collateralize debt. However, it left open the issue how 
failing banks should be handled and in particular it did not contain the legal option to close 
insolvent banks. 
 
Not withstanding these initial attempts, the already described “special political situation” which 
was marked by still powerful members of the socialist elite and peculiar cooperative patterns 
between all parties fostering personal enrichment spilled over to the economy in general and to 
the banking sector in particular. Hence the Bulgarian banking sector quickly developed into a 
rather fatal version of relationship banking embracing the corporate sector, the government sector 
and bank managers in a coalition that used the banking sector as a tool to rob households of their 
savings (Daskalov, 1998; Berlemann et al., 2002). A crucial role in this process was played by 
the financial elites which were connected to the BSP from which they received the money and the 
official permission to start banks. Once rich they were able to get access to political and 
administrative circles thus receiving the funds to refinance their unsound banks. Their behaviours 
explain why the newly created private banking sector did little to promote real development. 
Rather it was often used to finance dubious privatization deals executed by managers of state-
owned firms (Berlemann et al., 2002). 
 
By 1996 none of the banks had been privatized and it were the state banks that dominated the 
banking industry holding two thirds of bank assets (Enoch et al., 2002). Notably the shares of 
these banks were not only held by the government but also by state-owned firms who were 
borrowers themselves. (Enoch et al., 2002) The government used state-owned banks to extend 
loans to state enterprises thus subsidizing their losses (Berlemann, 2002; Mihov, 1999). Insider 
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lending was widespread and internal credit controls were largely missing. The low quality of 
loans extended to state-owned companies is closely related to a governance structure frequently 
referred to as “crony capitalism” that gave priority to asset stripping over restructurings in favour 
of long-run profitability (Peev, 2002). State enterprises were marked by “corporatization”, i.e. the 
state held 100% of the firm’s shares. These firms were largely controlled by their managers and 
other interest groups who both did not appear much interested in increasing the firm’s 
profitability but rather maximized their short-run utilities. As Peev (2002) describes it: 
“During 1992-86, the system of “crony” capitalism emerged with its main network being among former communist 
nomenklatura circles, weak state institutions and the criminal world. The typical motivation of the agents in this 
symbiosis has been to ransack national wealth.” (84) 
The principles of “crony capitalism” were also transplanted to private businesses which were 
created by managers of state enterprises in order to profit from transfer pricing. Notably these 
transactions were funded by the banking sector, too (Peev, 2002). A prominent feature of these 
“crony capitalism firms” was their reluctance to repay their debts. In state firms this attitude was 
supported by the ongoing readiness of the government to provide new debt, in the private sector 
an inclination of bank mangers to flee the country might also have played a role. 
 
The sustainability of ignoring borrower’s quality which finally drove the banking sector into a 
severe crisis by the middle of the 1990s was ensured by an interaction of poor and even counter-
productive legislation and poor enforcement of those laws that on principle were appropriate to 
foster sound bank practices. One example for detrimental legal norms is provided by the Bad 
Loans Act which was passed at the end of 1993. The law allowed the government to issue 
securities (ZUNK bonds) which allowed to transforming bad bank loans into government 
obligations. Another example is provided by the Law of the Budget which subordinated the 
independence of the central bank which was formally confirmed by the Law of BNB to fiscal 
needs (Berlemann, 2002; Mihov, 1999) Both types of “false” regulation assigned a special role to 
the BNB which Berlemann (2002) describes as “lender of first resort”. In fact between 1991 and 
1996 the sources of money supply exclusively rested on refinancing banks in order to back their 
bad loans and on granting loans to the government. Since banks used government bonds as 
collateral in order to obtain currency from BNB, its contribution to financing public debt was 
significantly higher. A final example of false regulation is given by the Bulgarian deposit 
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insurance scheme which was implemented by 1995 and factually was a state guarantee to 100% 
of deposits. This regulation enforced moral hazard in the banking industry further. 
 
The legal order was not only characterized by “false regulations” but also by missing regulations. 
For example, the absence of a bankruptcy code until the middle of the 1990s prevented the 
central bank from closing failing banks. Besides false and missing regulations poor law 
enforcement of appropriate laws was significant. One example is provided by severe restrictions 
imposed to BNB’s supervisory powers rendering the bank unable to place conservators in failing 
(Enoch et al., 2002). Another example concerns the courts which proved rather unwilling to 
punish fraudulent behaviour as a cause of loan default (Enoch et al., 2002). 
This development was tacitly tolerated by a rather mute community of depositors. In accordance 
with inherited paternalistic thinking they believed in the functioning of a public insurance system 
even before it was formally introduced. With inflation rising to exorbitant levels, with an 
increasing number of state banks being prone to fail, by 1995 the public finally became aware of 
the severity of the situation and reacted with bank runs which triggered contagion effects to yet 
profitable private banks. Initial policy response was marked by half-hearted measures. In 
particular the BNB failed to apply to the court system with the intention to close insolvent banks. 
The banking system relapsed into crisis which was now accompanied by severe depreciations of 
the Bulgarian currency as a due consequence of currency substitution. The banking crisis spilled 
over to public debt markets and the payments system finally plunging the economy into a deep 
recession (Enoch et al., 2002). Amidst the severe crisis a mass civic protest in the cities occurred 
marked by the conviction that radical change was imperative. And in fact, at the beginning of 
1997, the socialist party BSP had to abdicate from power. The major political parties decided to 
introduce a Currency Board Arrangement which factually started to work as early as in March 
1997 (Daskalov, 1998). 
5. The New Legal Order and its Implications for the Bulgarian Bank 
Credit Market 
It is needless to say that the banking sector had failed in accomplishing its major tasks which 
following Stiglitz (1992) are in particular the channelling of sufficient savings into profitable 
investment projects and the ensurement of debt repayment. Between May and June 1997, Koford 
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and Tschoegl (1997) interviewed Bulgarian bankers with the aim to explore their capability (and 
willingness) to distinguish between good and bad borrowers as well as their capability to ensure 
debt repayment. Their analysis confirmed that bank lending in Bulgaria at the time was 
dominated by social norms that contributed significantly to the malfunctioning of the credit 
market. In this respect secretiveness as a social norm which can be considered to derive from 
basic values that are rooted in collectivism (embeddedness) and high power distance, stands out 
prominently. Credit risk can be reduced greatly if a bank has easy access to information about 
firms’ quality which requires that firms are willing to reveal to banks or external rating agencies 
the necessary information. This, however, will not be observed in a society where people are 
convinced that the value of information decreases once it is passed around and where it is widely 
believed that “[h]olding information gives power” (Koford, Tschoegl, 1997:25). In due 
consequence firms were reluctant to present carefully worked out business plans, and external 
rating agencies did not develop. The impact of secretiveness as a social norm also affects 
borrowers’ willingness to repay on the one hand and banks’ willingness to cooperate thus making 
information about defaulting borrowers mutually available. A borrower’s willingness to repay is 
significantly affected by the risk of losing reputation in case of default. However, the risk of 
losing one’s reputation is high only if a bank’s experience with a defaulting borrower becomes 
public knowledge which was not the case in Bulgaria. It is interesting to note at this place that 
there existed a secrecy law allowing banks to inform other banks about defaulting borrowers 
which in reality never worked (Koford, Tschoegl, 1997). Hostility between state banks and 
private banks plaid a role, but bankers also stated that they did not want to help competitors and 
that it would help them to get repaid if a borrower got a loan from a competitor. The authors also 
found evidence that personal acquaintance served as a substitute for objective data. Lending to 
friends and relations who never repaid their loans was popular (Koford, Tschoegl, 1997). A 
further tool to ensure loan repayment is collateral which according to bank regulations even 
before 1997 banks were required to take. Obviously collateral was common in Bulgaria, though 
inefficient. Apart from difficulties finding market prices for the collateralized assets, bankers 
complained that borrowers usually concentrate much efforts on preventing the collateral to be 
taken in case of default. Quite often, the collateralized assets would disappear all of a sudden. 
Banks also complained about being treated in an unfair manner by the courts which were 
frequently influenced by borrowers. Not withstanding the fact that by 1997 banks no longer faced 
long delays in coming before the courts, they reported that borrowers could use procedural issues 
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to impose substantial delays (Koford, Tschoegl, 1997). The courts were reported not to show 
much interest in prosecuting fraudulent practices on the part of the borrower. 
 
Against this background in July 1997 a currency board was introduced together with a 
comprehensive system of prudential regulation and bank supervision and the lifting of capital 
controls thus facilitating foreign investment. Furthermore the corporate sector (financial and non-
financial firms) underwent a comprehensive privatization process. By 2000, only three state 
banks were left holding less than 20% of total banking system’s assets and more than 73% of 
banking system assets were either in foreign owned banks or branches of foreign banks among 
these were also offshore banks (Miller et al., 2001). In the following we analyse how the new 
legal order affected the functioning of the bank credit market. In this respect we are in particular 
interested in the interaction between the novel legal norms and social norms that still in 1997 
dominated the behaviour of lenders and borrowers alike. 
 
As the law and economic literature reveals, whenever law is not expressive being the case if those 
social norms are absent which ensure private law enforcement, law has to become imperative 
marked by strong legal enforcement mechanisms. On the other hand strong legal enforcement 
mechanisms are possible only if the judiciary is factually independent requiring that at least the 
members of the legal sector acknowledge the rule of the law. If this is not the case then the only 
way to enforcing law is the imposition of some external mechanism. This exactly was the way 
which Bulgaria has chosen by introducing a currency board arrangement.  
 
Under a pure currency board the volume of banknotes and coins to be issued by the central bank 
is fully determined by available foreign exchanges. Since the exchange rate is fixed this implies 
that the growth of banknotes and coins is completely determined by surpluses in the balance of 
payments (Ulgenerk et al., 2000; Miller et al., 2001). The central bank thus loses discretion over 
the money supply, its sole activities in this respect relate to converting foreign currency into 
domestic currency and vice versa at any time and without limit at the fixed exchange rate. This 
also means that lending to the government or to commercial banks is no longer possible. Hence, 
under a currency board, neither can the central bank finance public deficits, nor does the central 
bank have capabilities to sustain banks’ excessive risk taking by cheap refinancing loans. In 
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particular if the banking sector should slide into a crisis, there is factually nothing which the 
central bank can do (Miller et al., 2001). 
 
The Bulgarian currency board deviated from this ideal in some respects: Since the currency board 
was introduced at a time when the banking system was still highly fragile, it was decided to 
establish a Banking Department besides the Issue Department which is liable for the issue of 
banknotes and coins. A major task of the Banking Department was to act as a lender of last 
resort. To this purpose, the Banking Department received foreign exchanges which it is allowed 
to use under quite restrictive conditions: According to Regulation 6 a bank has to be illiquid and 
the stability of the banking system has to be at risk. Furthermore it has to be clear that liquidity 
from other sources is not available. Given these conditions, illiquid banks may obtain loans 
against liquid collateral for a period of 3 months (Miller et al., 2001). A second deviation of the 
Bulgarian currency board from its ideal version concerns the government’s financial transactions 
which are executed by the central bank. Provided that the timing of revenues and expenditures 
does not match perfectly, this, too can affect the issue of banknotes and coins. 
 
The sustainability of the currency board depends on the credibility of the official exchange rate. 
In particular the accumulation of bad debts in the banking sector which gives rise to speculative 
attacks on the domestic currency can impair this credibility. In due consequence, the currency 
board was coupled with a new “Law on Banks”. This new law introduced measures of prudential 
regulation that even exceed international and EU standards. This is in particular true with respect 
to the capital requirement ratio which amounts to 12% as compared to the EU provision of 8%. 
The required reserve ratios were initially fixed at 11% and later reduced to 8%. The new law also 
expands the supervisory authority of the BNB making it easier for the central bank to close 
failing banks. Moreover banks which now have to undertake internal risk control based on Basel 
II, are now regularly controlled by experts of the Banking Department the result of which is 
reported in a Quarterly Bulletin issued by the BNB.  
 
The idea of the currency board is to impose hard budget constraints to economic actors, where the 
hope is that finally all economic actors will be affected. Concerning banks it was a due 
consequence of the currency board that they became highly dependent on funds attracted from 
nonfinancial institutions their share increasing to 65-67% by 2000 (Miller et al., 2001). Though 
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the currency board together with a deposit insurance system continually increased households’ 
trust in the banking sector and also made foreign denominated deposits available to banks, the 
years until 2001 were marked by the pronounced reluctance of the commercial banking sector to 
extend loans to the Bulgarian private sector, in particular to firms. Rather, banks preferred 
investing abroad (Miller et al., 2001; Nenovsky et al., 2003). Credit shrank dramatically shortly 
after the crisis had reached its peak and declined even more after the introduction of the currency 
board and remained at below 20% of GDP until 2001 (Nenovsky et al., 2003). In an empirical 
analysis using econometric techniques Nenovsky et al. (2003) searched to explain this 
phenomenon. The did so testing hypotheses related to credit demand and supply based on data 
comprising the period between 1998 and 2001. Their major findings are the following: The 
currency board obviously did not curtail the lending capacity of the banking sector, i.e. foreign 
reserves did not impose an upper constraint to lending. Rather, banks’ reluctance to lend to the 
corporate sector can be explained by conservatism supported by the new system of prudential 
regulation and supervision. However, the authors have also found evidence that in this period 
bank lending was not much related to the financial health of enterprises. For example, no 
negative correlation between borrowers’ leverage and the size of loans was found. There is 
moreover evidence that larger firms and firms with the presence of majority owners had better 
access to bank loans. The same result was found for firms which are affiliated to business groups 
and have political connections, and firms with an offshore owner with rather dubious origin of 
capital. The authors conclude that the findings are related to prevailing governance structures 
which were still marked by crony capitalism. Indeed privatization in the corporate sector which 
took place above all between 1998 and 1999 (the so-called mass privatization), predominantly 
rested on voucher privatization and management and employee buyouts which according to Peev 
(2002) promoted the rise of new crony firms. Peev has found evidence for a dual enterprise sector 
with two types of governance structures, i.e. one resembling Western principles and crony 
capitalism. Notably crony firms were also be found among enterprises under foreign ownership, 
and newly created firms, too. Obviously these crony firms enjoyed more favourable lending 
conditions between 1998 and 2001. Miller et al. (2001) have moreover found evidence that in the 
first years after the introduction of the currency board court procedures were still slow and 
inefficient throwing up many barriers to lenders. 
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The years following 2001 are marked by a gradual increase in bank lending to the private sector 
one reason for this being the gradual reduction of foreign rates of return due to the weak 
condition of the world economy as compared to the ongoing economic recovery in Bulgaria 
(BNB Economic Review, February 2005). To what extent governance practices in both banks and 
non-financial enterprises have changed and which role the legal order might have played in this 
process, remains unclear, however. Of interest in this respect are some results of BNB 
supervision between January and March 2004 that were published in BNB Quarterly Bulletin 
March 2004. Here the BNB deplores as new development lacking adequate and rational reactions 
by banks to potential hazards involved by credit expansion. Bank managers proved to be over-
optimistic as regards their borrowers’ investment strategies. The supervisors found increasing 
“risk appetites” of banks managers. Some banks made loans to firms with unclear liquidity 
conditions. The central bank found that credit risk increases due to serious weaknesses in lending 
process management and significant lending to related interest. Banks with already low ratings 
increased credit risk further. Banks were reducing their degree of gross asset provisioning. 
Finally the BNB supervisors detected banks that did not anymore meet capital requirements. 
Overall the capital adequacy indicator revealed a downward trend. Of course this evidence might 
also be explained with bank managers’ lacking experience. However, taking the large degree of 
foreign ownership into account, one should not jump to conclusions. It may well be expected that 
foreign owners have an eye on their managers’ skills and promote training programmes. Hence 
some role for the Bulgarian cultural legacy might still exist.  
 
On the other hand we should not underestimate the overall favourable effects of the currency 
board on the bank credit market. Before 1997 developments in the banking sector that were 
marked by an increase in credit risk went largely unnoticed. Now, being legitimized to undertake 
active supervision, the BNB is capable to detect adverse developments at an early stage and react 
appropriately, and the BNB appears to be willing, too. Effective law enforcement thus may in the 
course of time have its pre-emptive effects setting bank managers the right incentives to avoid 
bad and excessive risks. The credit crunch that characterizes the first years after the introduction 
of the currency board, however, also reveals that it is not enough to regulate the banking sector 
efficiently. The well-functioning of the banking sector is highly dependent on good governance 
principles guiding the behaviour of all participants including the non-financial corporate sector, 
too. Given that the rule of law might still lack wide acceptance, enforcement has to be guaranteed 
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by external mechanisms. In this respect accession of Bulgaria to EU could be coupled with the 
requirement of adequate laws, and with respect to their enforcement, the EU could play an active 
role. 
6. Conclusion 
In fact there has by now been reached a consensus view that the Washington Consensus which in 
its original version recommended a shock therapy in order to achieve fast and successful 
transition, is at least not a sufficient condition for successful transition. Economic research has 
come to the conclusion that institutions – in particular legal and social norms – play a pivotal role 
in the process of economic transition. Since in particular social norms change only slowly, a 
gradualist approach has increasingly been recommended that allows law and social norms to 
complement each other in a welfare enhancing manner. Indeed the gradualist approaches that 
have been chosen by transition countries differ with respect to whether a relationship between 
law and social norms has been recognized and if so, how it was handled. A prominent example of 
a successful transition story is posed by Poland where politics assumed an active role in 
reconciling transplanted law and social norms and even successfully furthered the development 
of market-friendly norms (McDermott, 2003). The success of this “embedded politics approach”, 
however, has been crucially associated with politicians, legislators and judges who were 
convinced of the benefits accruing from transforming their socialist economies into democratic 
market economies. This made politicians rather innovative as regards the implementation of 
institutions that promised to foster transition without provoking poverty and mass unemployment 
and set members of the judiciary incentives to abide by the rule of law. In fact, in Poland 
collectivism and high power distance was never so much pronounced than in other transition 
countries like Bulgaria. In this country the public sector was far from being convinced about the 
necessity to increase aggregate welfare. Rather the institutional vacuum was used here for the 
benefit of some few well-organized groups. The rule of law was widely absent leading to rather 
poor law enforcement. Hence the embedded politics approach that proved successful in Poland 
would have been impossible in Bulgaria where gradualism “…actually amounted to the gradual 
exhaustion of resources…” (Daskalov, 1998:28). The banking sector and in particular the bank 
credit market played a prominent role in this unsuccessful transition process. Well organized 
groups used banks for personal enrichment, and in this process bribery and corruption lead to 
heavy involvement of the public sector, too. An already existing bank law thus was hardly ever 
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enforced. This development was more or less tacitly tolerated by the civil society that continued 
to be rooted in collective and paternalistic value dimensions. 
Only after a banking crisis had plunged the real economy into depression and many households 
into poverty did the civil society finally wake up. However, the previous years and the crisis itself 
had eroded general trust in politics and judiciary as well. In order to increase credibility, the 
newly elected government opted for the introduction of a currency board as an external 
enforcement mechanism of legal norms in the financial system. Bulgaria has successfully avoided 
any banking crisis ever since. However, the bank credit market still reveals flaws with respect to 
soundness and efficiency which at least partly can be explained by the fact that still the norms of 
crony capitalism have a say. The introduction of further external enforcement mechanisms which 
ensure that managers’ decisions are guided by good governance practice appears promising. This 
is not to say that external enforcement mechanisms provide a final and complete solution to 
Bulgaria’s problems. But they may serve as some kind of educational mechanism and besides 
they give those people who are willing to comply with the law the informal power to bring others 
to comply with it, too. In this way law has a chance to become increasingly expressive. 
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